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Abstract 
Climate change has been well-established in the academic community, and has been 
studied for centuries. It is predicted to have many effects on the world, one of them being 
increases in water stress. Water stress can be seen through shifting precipitation patterns in both 
directions, shifting access to groundwater or changing groundwater supply, and increased 
demand, among other factors. This study looks at how precipitation changes have had an impact 
on conflict severity in countries throughout Africa, as well as how ethnic group distributions, 
temperature changes, GDP levels, and regional changes affect conflict severity through negative 
binomial regressions. It looks at conflicts from 1997 to 2014 on the African continent. When 
conflicts occur during times of negative water stress, the results indicated an increase in conflict 
severity and supported the hypotheses. When conflicts occur during times of positive water 
stress, the results differed depending on the region. As water stress worsens and temperatures 
increase with global warming, conflicts will get more severe, especially for less developed 
nations with large numbers of ethnic groups.  
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Introduction 
Anthropogenic climate change is anticipated to have consequences that reach beyond just 
the environment (Homer-Dixon 1994; Tol 2009). Global warming is linked to an enhanced 
greenhouse effect, which is the result of increased anthropogenic, or man-made, emissions of 
greenhouse gases, especially carbon. As the average global temperature continues to rise, and the 
climate becomes more prone to extremes, climate change raises security questions for both 
developed and developing countries. As early as 1990, a report filed with the United States 
Naval War College explored the potential security implications of global warming for the United 
States Navy, expressing concern that “nearly all areas of operational effectiveness are threatened 
by these environmental changes [of climate change]” (Kelley 1990). Climate change is predicted 
to cause many environmental shifts, from melting polar ice caps and massive flooding to 
changing precipitation patterns and megadroughts. As climates continue to change, so will 
resource distribution, and conflicts may begin to arise (Bernauer, Bohmelt, Koubi 2012; Gleick 
1993). Increased water stress is an anticipated result of climate change, and one that has been 
claimed to have already led to conflict and is predicted to cause more (Hendrix and Salehyan 
2012; Homer-Dixon 1994; Raleigh and Urdal 2007).  
This study looks at how water stress has had an impact on conflict severity in countries 
throughout Africa. To do so, it uses the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project’s 
database to study conflicts in Africa. It also uses air temperature and precipitation datasets from 
the University of Delaware’s Center for Climatic Research, and the World Development 
Indicators database from the World Bank. Furthermore, the International Groundwater Resources 
Assessment Centre’s Groundwater Resources in Africa database will be used for climatic and 
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water resource data. This study will attempt to determine what, if any, effect water and 
temperature stress has on conflict severity, which this study will define as the number of deaths 
in a conflict. It will study water stress through looking at differing precipitation levels, increased 
temperatures, and access to alternative water sources. This study will then explore the different 
factors that contribute to conflict due to water stress, including ethnic distributions, the Gross 
Domestic Product of the nation where the conflict took place, and regional variations in conflict 
severity.  
First, it will examine the history of climate change research, and what the effects of 
climate change are expected to be. Next, water stress and trends in water demand will be 
considered. Then, it will discuss certain risk factors that make areas more vulnerable to the 
effects of global warming. This study focuses on Africa, and presents a brief case study to 
demonstrate the connection between water stress and conflict on that continent before presenting 
the quantitative research.  
History of Climate Change Research 
Over a century of research has gone into climate science, beginning with work performed 
by Joseph Fourier in 1824. Fourier introduced the idea that the Earth’s temperature was affected 
by three principal sources of heat: solar radiation, primordial heat diffusing from the core of the 
planet, and heat from interplanetary space (Fourier 1824). The idea of anthropogenic global 
warming specifically as a result of enhanced greenhouse gases dates back to 1896, when Svante 
Arrhenius hypothesized that coal-burning was causing the temperature of the Earth to rise 
(Arrhenius 1896). His paper is now considered to be the birth of modern climate science. At the 
time, Arrhenius considered this rising temperature to be a good change, as it would make the 
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overall climate more hospitable and make the northern countries more desirable. His living in 
Sweden, admittedly, might have had to do with his attitude. In 1938, Guy Callendar showed that 
carbon dioxide levels were rising along with temperatures, a trend that became known as the 
“Callendar Effect.” Callendar also discussed the Urban Heat Island Effect, by which temperature 
readings are warmer in cities than in open spaces due to decreased albedo, or reflective power 
(Albedo 2018; Callendar 1938). 
Our current carbon dioxide concentrations show how drastic of an effect global warming 
has had on our climate. Ice core bubbles have established the historical carbon dioxide 
concentrations and their correlation to past interglacial and glacial periods. Going back over 
160,000 years, carbon dioxide concentrations have vacillated between approximately 180 and 
280 parts per million, the former in glacial periods and the latter in interglacial periods. While 
this seemed low compared to 
the 345 parts per million 
concentration in 1938 when 
Callendar’s paper was 
written, compared to our 
current 408 parts per million 
concentration, 280 parts per 
million seems positively 
distant (see figure 1) 
(Barnola et al. 1987; CO2 
Earth 2018). This research has continued both privately and through government sources. The 
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change was set up by the United Nations and is dedicated 
to providing as close to an objective and purely scientific, meaning without political or social 
influence, view on climate change as possible. In the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report report, 
they decreed “human influence on the climate system is clear, and recent anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases are the highest in history” (IPCC 2015, 1). 
Among modern academics and climate scientists, there is a consensus that climate change 
is both anthropogenic in nature and is ongoing. In Naomi Oreskes’s study conducted in 2004, out 
of 928 surveyed academic papers that mention climate change, not a single one disagreed with 
the existence of climate change. This consensus was further substantiated in 2013, when Evan 
Lehmann’s survey of over one thousand scientists resulted in 97% of those respondents agreeing 
that climate change was real and that humans were the cause. In J.S. Carlton’s 2015 study, the 
few scientists who did not agree with climate change had disagreements over basic facts, such as 
the effects of carbon dioxide on the climate. These scientists were, unsurprisingly, found to have 
different cultural and political values from the supporters of anthropogenic climate change. It 
was also determined that the more participants used mass media as opposed to scientific 
literature to obtain information on climate change, the less likely they were to be certain of the 
existence of anthropogenic climate change. Essentially, what all this means is that within the 
scientific community, there is a clear consensus on climate change; it is real, and it is man-made. 
Effects of Climate Change 
Perhaps the most well-known consequence of global warming is, as one might expect, 
increasing temperatures. In 2012, a study by James Hansen found that there was a significantly 
increasing amount of unusually high temperatures in the past three decades (see figure 2). There 
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has been a large increase, greater than an order of magnitude, in the size of the category of 
extremely hot summers, or summers in which the 
mean temperature is over three standard 
deviations greater than average. Essentially, this 
means that summers are getting much, much 
hotter than they have been in the past. 
Furthermore, this rapid increase in temperature is 
not just happening in one place; rather, there are 
entire regions of the world seeing this sharp 
uptick. While local extreme warming is not a new 
phenomenon, these large, spread out areas of 
extreme warming are. Temperature deviations also have many secondary effects beyond just the 
hotter weather, and are one of the contributing factors to water stress (Lobell, Schlenker, 
Costa-Roberts 2011; Walther 2002; Wheeler and von Braun 2013). 
Climate change is anticipated to have many effects, including rising sea levels, ocean 
acidification, desertification, soil degradation, increased wildfires, and increased storm 
frequency, severity, and duration to name just a few (NASA 2017b). These changes are not 
isolated, and actually can all be interrelated; as temperatures increase, droughts can be more 
likely to occur, causing soil degradation and a subsequent loss of agricultural land (Homer-Dixon 
1994). Some of these effects could cause resource shortage-based conflict without even being 
related to climate change, including the degradation and loss of agricultural land and forests, the 
depletion and pollution of fresh water supplies, and the depletion of fisheries (Homer-Dixon 
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1994). It is important to note that not all climate and ecological problems are because of 
anthropogenic climate change; in fact, these aforementioned problems already existed, and some 
actually contribute to climate change. Climate change will just simply make these problems 
worse.  
Water stress is expected to increase as the world continues to warm, partially through the 
continued depletion and pollution of freshwater and decreases in water quality, though this will 
not affect all countries and regions equally (Vorosmarty et al. 2000; Whitehead et al. 2009). 
Certain areas are anticipated to suffer more severely from a lack of usable water than others. 
Called colloquially the “wet-get-wetter, dry-get-drier” paradigm, a theory advanced by Held and 
Solden’s 2006 paper states that areas which are predisposed to drought will become more and 
more dry, whereas areas that traditionally have greater precipitation will become more likely to 
flood. Simply put, extremes will become more extreme (Putnam and Broecker 2017). The 
Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, and Southeast Asia, for example, are all predicted to 
experience increased water stress due to decreased precipitation more generally than other parts 
of the world, though each region in different ways (World Resources Institute 2018a). Other 
parts of the world, including East Africa, are going to experience increased water stress due to 
drastic increases in precipitation rates. This is especially true for areas that already experience 
oversaturation of water during wet seasons. In many of these areas there are other social, 
political, and economic problems plaguing them already, which could exacerbate the problems 
posed by water stress. 
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Water Stress 
Defining water stress can be a complicated task, and there already are many different 
definitions. Water stress can be defined as extreme deviations in either direction away from the 
mean in terms of water accessibility and precipitation, as well as a degradation in water quality. 
The United Nations defines a country as reaching critical water stress levels when there is less 
than 1500 cubic meters of potable freshwater per person annually (Brozek 2013). Another way to 
look at water stress is to look at how much water availability varies from dry years to mean 
values, and look at how extreme values vary between regions. One could also compare the 
average annual runoff, or the amount that is discharged from the area, to the withdrawal rate, and 
look at the amount of water available per person (Arnel 2004; USGS 2018). Furthermore, it is 
not clear how exactly warming will affect precipitation and water resource systems (Taylor, 
Koussis, and Tindimugaya 2009). In other words, water stress can be experienced as a result of 
too much water as well as too little, and can be caused not only because of differing amounts of 
rain, but also because of problems with the water once it reaches the ground. Most of these 
definitions, however, arise from an intent to treat water stress as a categorical or dichotomous 
variable that you either are or are not. For this study, water stress will not be treated as a 
dichotomy, but rather it will be evaluated as a scale with multiple contributing factors.  
One factor that contributes to water stress is the distribution of freshwater. While water is 
considered a renewable resource, freshwater is only a small fraction of the world’s water 
resources and is oftentimes poorly distributed (Brozek 2013). The distribution issue is caused by 
a variety of problems, including political and environmental ones. Politically speaking, reliable 
access to water is crucial for political and social development, but water does not obey political 
 
 
 
Drake 11 
boundaries. Oftentimes water resources are under the control of one nation or group to the 
detriment of others (Gleick 1993). As a result, political actors that use transboundary water 
resources have the opportunity to interfere with other actors’ access. While according to 
international law transboundary water sources should be shared equitably and reasonably, a 
collective action problem exists; each actor has the temptation to use the water without concern 
for others or for long term sustainability (Brozek 2013; International Law Commission 2008; 
Saeijs and van Berkel 1995). This means that because water sources are not limited to one 
country or one group of people, each actor has an incentive to use the supply before anyone else 
does.  
Environmentally speaking, there are a number of factors that contribute to water stress. 
Freshwater comes from two different types of sources: surface water, or blue water, and 
groundwater, also known as brown water (USGS Water Science School 2017). Looking first at 
blue water, precipitation is one of the ways surface water is produced, and is defined as a deposit 
on the earth of rain, sleet, mist, snow, or hail. Precipitation can have a lot of natural variation 
both geographically and over time (Theisen, Holtermann, and Buhaug 2012). One way water 
stress can occur is because of precipitation extremes on both ends of the spectrum - increases in 
precipitation can cause damage as well as decreases, as well as issues with water quality. As 
previously discussed, some areas get too much water, while others do not get nearly enough. 
Annually, climate change is predicted to cause even greater precipitation variations of 10-25%, 
while monthly the extremes would be even larger (Arnel 2004; Gleick 1993). Increases can 
especially cause stress in traditionally wet seasons when the extra water is unavailable during the 
dry season and instead hits an oversaturated area (Arnel 2004). In the event of too much water, 
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there can be flooding, mudslides, increased disease, and crop damage. When there is too little 
precipitation, there can be drought, potential crop failure, and reduced water availability 
(Hendrix and Salehyan 2012). For the purposes of this study, “positive” water stress will 
describe when there is more precipitation than average, and “negative” water stress will describe 
when there is less precipitation than average. 
Issues with groundwater also can contribute to water stress. Groundwater is water stored 
in the ground in aquifers. Groundwater is more steady and resilient to weather and climate 
variations because of its slow movement, especially when the supply is not impacted by 
precipitation (Taylor, Koussis, and Tindimugaya 2009). It is the largest accessible store of 
reliable freshwater for most people, especially when river discharges and precipitation patterns 
are variable or particularly low. This kind of resource is usually potable, and can sustain 
communities when surface waters are not as constant (Taylor, Koussis, and Tindimugaya 2009). 
Aquifers, however, can be harder to access than surface water. Coastal aquifers and surface 
water sources especially are vulnerable not only to changing precipitation patterns, but also to a 
degradation in their water quality as a result of sea level rise increasing saltwater concentrations 
(Taylor, Koussis, and Tindimugaya 2009).  
Water stress can be caused by issues with water quality, as well as water quantity. With 
increased pollution or other water quality degradation, there does not necessarily need to be 
changes in the precipitation pattern for there to be a change in the level of water stress. As sea 
levels increase, countries with non-renewable aquifers (aquifers that are not rainfed and do not 
receive surface runoff) and countries which take more water out of renewable aquifers than is put 
in will be more vulnerable to water quality degradation. When an aquifer is pumped below its 
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water table, which is essentially its stability point, it draws on water from its environment in 
order to boost its levels to match the water table, no matter the quality of the exterior water. As a 
result, when an aquifer is over pumped, it can draw in lower quality water from its surroundings 
and increase the saline concentration of the aquifer among other contaminant concentrations 
(Al-Ibrahim 1991). This means that in times when precipitation is particularly low, water stress 
can come both from a lack of surface water and a subsequent degradation in groundwater quality. 
Essentially, there are many factors to consider in determining water stress. Increased 
water stress due to climate change can be the result of many factors, including shifting 
precipitation patterns, extreme weather events, overuse of aquifers, faulty water infrastructure, 
poor or variable economic development, greater use of the water supply, increased pollution, and 
exacerbation of politically unclear and volatile claims to water sources. As temperatures rise, so 
will evaporation rates as well as water demands. Even without changes in precipitation, water 
availability can decrease by 10% or more just from small rises in temperature (Gleick 1993, 96). 
These changes can affect both brown water and blue water, and to ignore one leaves out a crucial 
part of the community’s water access. Whether a community has access to clean groundwater 
through an aquifer should be considered a factor in determining if they are undergoing water 
stress, though it is harder to get an accurate assessment of groundwater sources. Overall, there 
may be plenty of freshwater on (and in) the planet for the world’s population, but ensuring that it 
is safe to drink, accessible, storable, and able to be moved from where it is to where it needs to 
be is far from a simple task (Brozek 2013; Schiefler 2017). By 2030, between 374 and 1661 
million people are predicted to experience an increase in water stress (Arnel 2004). People do not 
just need any water, they need water that is safe, accessible, and drinkable.  
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Risk Factors 
Certain economic and geographical factors put countries at more of a risk of climate 
change, especially water stress. Economically, less-developed countries will face more extreme 
impacts due to a lack of resources which otherwise could help mitigate the effects of water stress 
(Gentle et al. 2014). This means that even if a more-developed country were to experience the 
same environmental event as a less-developed one, they would be better equipped to deal with 
both prevention and recovery than the less-developed nation. There is not a clear divide between 
less-developed and more-developed countries’ water usage levels; for example, both the United 
States and Niger have a total water footprint of over 3000 cubic meters per person annually 
(Hoekstra and Mekonnen 2012). The Democratic Republic of Congo and China both meanwhile 
have some of the lowest water usage levels of less than 1000 cubic meters per person annually 
for China and under 750 for the DRC (Hoekstra and Mekonnen 2012). Thus, while some 
countries may require more water and subsequently be more vulnerable, there is not a definitive 
link between a country’s water usage and their economic status.  
A country’s gross domestic product is one of the most important factors in determining 
its response to climate change. Research shows that wealth decreases the probability of violent 
conflict, and that recessions increase the risk of conflict (Humphreys 2003). This could be 
because less-developed countries are more inclined to experience negative effects from resource 
shortages as they do not have the capabilities or resources, or oftentimes the knowledge, to 
overcome and mitigate them (Theisen 2012). Less-developed and low-income countries are 
predicted to suffer a loss of a greater economic percentage of their GDP, although the 
more-developed world will lose overall more money (see figure 3). As a result, overall inequality 
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will be further 
exacerbated between 
countries (United 
Nations 2016). 
Countries with lower 
GDPs per capita also 
have more poverty, 
which leads to 
emigration and 
conflict over limited 
resources between differing groups (Humphreys 2003). They do not have the luxury of being 
able to put money and time into planning for long-term prevention, and thus must instead do 
their best to mitigate the damage when it comes.  
There is high potential for dispute when water stress impacts a marginalized population. 
The population will be unable to make alternative modes of living due to lack of resources, and 
are more likely to be ignored by the government (Theisen 2012). Water stress and other impacts 
from climate change lead the at-risk population into a cycle: the inherent inequalities lead to 
greater risk and exposure for the marginalized group to the environmental changes, which leads 
to a disproportionate loss of lives and income for the marginalized group, exacerbating the 
inherent inequalities and continuing the cycle (United Nations 2016). These disadvantaged 
groups generally have fewer options for diversifying their livelihoods, and thus are unable to 
adapt as quickly or as easily to changing climates. Furthermore, these disadvantaged groups 
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typically operate in the most at-risk environments, both physically being more exposed to natural 
disasters including mudslides, wind storms, and droughts, and economically being more exposed 
with more expendable occupations and tenuous livelihoods. In a study done in Nepal, for 
example, it was found that lower-income houses suffered on average 2.63 environmental hazards 
over a six-year period, while well-off households suffered only 1.76 on average over the same 
time scale (Gentle et al. 2014). 
Certain areas are going to be more vulnerable to different effects of climate change and 
water stress. Island, coastal, low-lying, and equatorial nations are all more likely to be at risk of 
sea-level rise and resulting water quality degradation (IPCC 2001). By 2100, most projections 
conservatively estimate 
that sea level will rise 
between 0.2 and 2 
meters, with the two 
greatest sources of that 
rise coming from thermal 
expansion of seawater 
and melting land ice 
(NASA n.d.). Sea levels 
have been steadily rising with a current rate of change of 3.4 millimeters per year (see figure 4). 
If the Greenland Ice Sheet, which contains 9% of the world’s land ice, were to melt, sea levels 
would rise another 23 feet (Gregory, Huybrechts, and Raper 2004). Antarctica, meanwhile, 
which holds 90% of the world’s land ice, has enough ice to raise sea levels by another 200 feet. 
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Antarctica is losing ice more slowly than Greenland, but the latest data estimated it is still losing 
about 92 billion tons of ice per year (Lythe and Vaughan 2001). Sea level rise poses a risk not 
only for the loss of land area, but also for the resulting salinity increase in water sources.  
Africa as a Research Focus 
This study focuses on Africa. Africa is just over 30 million square kilometers, and 
contains a wide variety of climates and environments. Its climates include humid equatorial, 
seasonally humid, semi-arid, arid, and sub-tropical Mediterranean, while its biomes include 
scrub land and savannah environments, lowland and montane forests, and deserts (IPCC 2007; 
Taylor, Koussis, and Tindimugaya 2009). Partially because of this diversity, effects of climate 
change across Africa are not going to be uniform. 54 countries belong to both the African Union 
and the United Nations, though the count can vary significantly depending on which countries 
are recognized and one’s political stance (Brown, Hammill, Mcleman 2007, 1143; United 
Nations 2017). There are 113 transboundary water sources in Africa, and about 60% of Africa’s 
territory falls into a transboundary watershed. Every state in Africa uses water from at least one 
transboundary water source making it the most hydrologically interdependent region on the 
planet (Brozek 2013). 
Africa was selected as the nexus of this study as the effects of climate change are 
anticipated to be seen sooner and more intensely in Africa than the rest of the world (Brown, 
Hammill, and Mcleman 2007; Taylor, Koussis, and Tindimugaya 2009). The projected warming 
across the continent is predicted to be 1.5 times the global mean (Taylor, Koussis, and 
Tindimugaya 2009). Africa is anticipated to experience an increase in frequency and severity of 
floods, droughts, and storms, especially in coastal areas (see figures 5 through 7) (Aqueduct 
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Water Risk Atlas 2017; Brown, Hammill, Mcleman 2007). Thanks to increases in both intense 
rainfall events and sea level rise, flooding events are predicted to become more frequent, with 
areas like the Nile Delta, being both densely populated and low-lying, becoming extremely 
vulnerable to sea level rise. Erratic rainfall, longer dry periods, and more intense rainfall events 
are expected to place pressure on African agriculture and economies (Hendrix and Salehyan 
2012). Africa’s agricultural sector especially is predicted to be affected by water stress due to 
climate change; by 2020, between 75 and 250 million people on the continent are expected to be 
under increased water stress, resulting in some countries’ yields being reduced by up to 50%. 
Sub-Saharan Africa and southeast Asia may have already begun experiencing decreased land 
productivity as a result of water stress (United Nations 2016). 
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Africa also has a wide variety of social, political, and ethnic groups. Over 70% of the 
population in sub-Saharan Africa lacks basic civil rights and liberties, qualifying as a 
marginalized group. Strong ethnic divides are present in nearly every state; in Nigeria, for 
example, there are approximately 160 different ethnic groups, while there are as many as 2000 
different languages spoken on the continent as a whole (Hitchcock 1993). This large number of 
different ethnic groups could contribute to conflict severity. Partially as a result of Africa’s 
history with colonialism, many of the political borders cut through natural borders and divides, 
resulting in more transboundary water sources. This also contributes to the degradation of 
historical tribal governments, resulting in a high diversity of political types and strengths (Brozek 
2013).  
There are problems with the data available on Africa. While understanding the 
importance and demand of groundwater resources and systems in Africa is crucial to 
understanding the effects of water stress, a common characteristic of all African hydrological 
systems is a lack of sustained time series data as well as a lack of observations overall. 
Taylor et al. (2009) discusses how the water resources available in Africa are not 
well-established, and there is high variability in the rainfall in Africa. As a result, 95% of the 
annual rainfall totals deviate 20-40% from the mean. There is significant variance in 
precipitation and subsequent river discharge both from year to year and from season to season. 
Total withdrawals could range from 4050 cubic kilometers per year to 4590 cubic kilometers per 
year, but the significance of that amount depends on both the amount of precipitation fallen and 
the pattern at which it fell. A portion of the freshwater resources occur as groundwater in 
aquifers, not as precipitation, though estimates range for this amount being anywhere from 15% 
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to over 50%. As a result, looking only at precipitation levels does not take into account what 
could be a large portion of the continent’s water resources. These aquifer estimates are supported 
by very few data points, however, and only consider a very small proportion of renewable 
resources. Groundwater is relied upon as the primary source of drinking water by approximately 
50-75% of the African population, meaning any study that looks at water stress in Africa needs 
to consider groundwater as well as surface water in its assessment.  
Darfur -- A Case Study 
Darfur has become one of the most frequently cited examples of modern climate conflict. 
This analysis of this case illustrates how climate change can lead to conflict. One view of the 
region is that the drought in the 1980s led to conflict through a multi-year famine that 
exacerbated pre-existing ethnic divides. These studies contend that the drought caused by climate 
change began a domino effect that took 30 years to reach fruition. The drought led to a famine, 
which caused a heightening of tribal rivalries over grazing land and water (Mazo 2010). On the 
other hand, some find that the link between the drought and the onset of the conflict to be far too 
tenuous. Kevane and Gray (2008) determined that the connection between low precipitation rates 
and the conflict could not be drawn as the precipitation dropped 30 years before the conflict 
began. 
Sub-Saharan Africa, and Sudan in particular, is very vulnerable to water stress. The 
United Nations Environmental Program (2005) reported that since Sudan’s independence in 
1956, nearly three-quarters of the violent local conflicts in the area have involved grazing and 
water rights. One-third of the African population as a whole lives in drought-prone areas, and 
almost all of sub-Saharan Africa is predicted to be in water stress areas by 2025 (Theisen 2012). 
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Right now, in sub-Saharan Africa over 340 million people lack access to potable water, and only 
4% of annual renewable water flows are stored. For context, about 70 to 90% of annual 
renewable water flows are stored on average in the developed world (Hendrix and Salehyan 
2012). The northern area of Darfur is a desert, the central part a plateau, and the southern part a 
tundra that usually experiences plentiful precipitation. The primary source of income in Darfur is 
rainfed crop cultivation. Regions where agriculture is currently a marginal enterprise, largely due 
to a combination of poor soils, water scarcity, and rural poverty, suffer increasingly as a result of 
climate change impacts on water (Kevane and Gray 2008). As a result, even small changes in 
climate will increase the number of people at risk of hunger, with the impact being particularly 
great in sub-Saharan Africa, including Sudan. 
The conflict in Darfur has been ongoing. The current war began in 2003 and has since 
devolved into a genocide. Since its independence in 1956, political instability and civil war has 
marred Sudan. From 1980 to 1984, Darfur was in a prolonged drought. Throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s, this drought worked in combination with desertification and increased population 
growth to produce a steep decline in food production and a subsequent rise in famine. Sedentary 
farmers and pastoralists soon began to clash over resources as supplies dwindled (Kevane and 
Gray 2008). As pastoral nomads moved south from the desert following the traditional 
arrangements agreed upon years prior, with the changing climate and unpredictable harvests, 
sedentary farmers found themselves competing more with the nomads over more and more 
limited resources. With the degradation of the traditional tribal system brought on by colonialism 
and the government, tribal leaders had less control over their people and were unable to mediate 
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conflicts, meaning that even as they got worse, there were fewer mitigation strategies available to 
deal with them (Sikainga 2009). 
The conflict in Darfur subsequently began to be called a climate conflict. In June 2007, 
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (2007) declared that anthropogenic climate 
change was a major contributing factor to the Darfur conflict. Before that, while the idea of 
Darfur being a climate conflict had been discussed, it had only been publically been declared to 
be one by environmentalists such as Al Gore (Kevane and Gray 2008). To declare the genocide 
in Darfur to be solely a climate conflict would be a specious leap at best; there were many other 
ethnic and political tensions at work, and the drought and subsequent famine acted more as a 
spark on an already-built tinderbox. Climate change surely did play a role in beginning the 
events in Darfur, but it certainly was not the only factor at play. Calls to name Darfur as the first 
definitive instance of acute climate conflict are oftentimes overinflated and politicized; by 
making climate change a life-threatening and urgent security threat, it can go from being a liberal 
environmental issue to a national security one. Still, climate change did act as a threat-multiplier 
in Darfur, giving rise to conflict where one might not have occurred before or, at least, it sped up 
the process. Thus, while Darfur may not have been a case of acute climate conflict, climate 
change-induced water stress had a role in setting the stage for the conflict. 
Literature on Water Stress and Conflict  
The field of climate conflict research is relatively young, and existing research on the 
connection between water stress and conflict is conflicted. Within the hypothesis that water 
stress leads to an increase in conflict there are a number of suggested explanatory mechanisms. 
One common mechanism to explain this is a simple scarcity model in which water shortages 
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leads to resource scarcity, which subsequently causes increases in competition (Bernauer, 
Bohmelt, Koubi 2012; Brown, Hammill, Mcleman 2007; Hendrix and Salehyan 2012; 
Homer-Dixon 1994; Mazo 2010; Yoffe et al. 2004). Environmental scarcities, such as water 
shortages, can have three different types of causes: supply-induced scarcity, in which the 
resource availability is decreased due to degradation or usage rates greater than the regeneration 
rates, demand-induced scarcity, such as increased consumption because of growing population 
growth rates, and structural scarcity caused by distribution issues (Bernauer, Bohmelt, Koubi 
2012). This increased competition makes conflict more likely. This especially applies to 
shortages that involve basic needs, such as, in this case, water shortages. There has been some 
evidence to support the idea, however, that increased water access actually contributes to 
conflict. In this case, actors will not launch campaigns when there is not enough access to water 
to supply the combatants during the conflict (Hendrix and Salehyan, 2012).  
A second mechanism to explain the connection between water stress and conflict severity 
is through conflicts over group identity caused by migration due to resource shortages (Bernauer, 
Bohmelt, Koubi 2012; Raleigh et al. 2008; Raleigh 2010; Sandler 2004). Undue water stress, 
caused by either too much or too little water, could cause resource shortages. These shortages 
could be either the water itself in the event of too little water, or could be something else, such as 
a food shortage as a result of floods and agricultural field destruction. The group who relies on 
the resource experiencing the shortage would then move to find other resources, and conflict 
between the pre-existing population and the immigrating population could occur. Ethnic divides 
or disputes could increase the severity of conflict (Theisen, Holtermann, and Buhaug 2012). 
Already having an “us-against-them” mentality allows for easier dehumanization of the enemy 
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and for each group to feel they have justice on their side, increasing the likelihood of armed 
conflict. Otherwise, new factions must be formed with new power structures and organizations. 
Furthermore, the conflict, rather than being about the absolute level of resources, is more about 
the distribution of the resources (Bernauer, Bohmelt, Koubi 2012; Hendrix and Salehyan 2012; 
Homer-Dixon 1994). Limited resources then become both a source of conflict and a further 
weapon to be used in ethnic or political conflict.  
As agricultural conditions shift, workers may begin to move away from hard-hit areas, 
exacerbating pre-existing economic problems or creating new ones with a decreasing labor force 
in the area where they originated and causing increased competition for resources where they go. 
Traditional cycles of planting and harvest will likely be interrupted or changed altogether as 
precipitation patterns change (Hendrix 2012). It is important to remember agriculture, for better 
or worse, is affected by many factors other than just climate; the agricultural methods used and 
the tools available to the farmers can have a much more significant effect on how successful a 
farm is than the climate (Howden 2007). They can also impact the likelihood of a country’s 
success in adapting to new environments; these methods, though, typically require significant 
investment not available to most developing nations. Thus, a country’s economic welfare can 
also affect the likelihood of water stress contributing to conflict severity. 
A third mechanism for the connection of water stress and conflict explains that the 
resource shortage could cause a decrease in economic welfare of the state and subsequently 
disrupt the government and critical social institutions. Because of environmental shortages, 
economic deprivation occurs which leads to civil strife. These shortages also lead to increased 
financial and political pressure on the state, and creates more groups dependent on the state for 
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support and survival. In weaker states, this pressure can leave the government vulnerable. Thus, 
civil war and insurgency would be more likely to occur (Homer-Dixon 1994; Wischnath and 
Buhaug 2014). This vulnerability to resource degradation is especially prevalent in poorer 
countries and countries that depend on natural resources (Brown, Hammill, and Mcleman 2007; 
Homer-Dixon 1994).  
Another explanation applies to transboundary water resources in that these resources pose 
a collective action problem. River water specifically is expected to be the most likely renewable 
resource at the source of conflict in the future (Homer-Dixon 1994). As a result, as these 
resources become more scarce and thus more valuable, the parties that depend on these resources 
are more willing to pursue guaranteed access in the face of greater costs and risks of military 
fighting (Brozek 2013). Thus, having a shared aquifer could exacerbate conflicts. Another 
explanation given is that an abundance of natural resources can lead to political violence, again 
especially over distribution. These kinds of conflicts, however, tend to be focused over more 
nonrenewable, valuable resources rather than necessities (Hendrix, Salehyan 2012).  
Finally, a commonly accepted explanation for the connection between climate change 
and conflict is that climate change is a ‘threat multiplier’, and exacerbates pre-existing conditions 
rather than causing the conflict in and of itself, as climate conflict is often understood (CNA 
Corporation, 2007; Theisen, Holtermann, and Buhaug 2012). Armed conflict does not produce 
more natural resources, and instead may use even more of the limited supply (Hendrix 2012, 
Brozek 2013). Water stress merely increases pre-existing divides and fractures, making other 
conflicts more severe. Therefore, the fact that areas in the past had experienced conflict or had 
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issues that ordinarily would not warrant conflict would make them more likely to then 
experience severe conflict when water stress is added. 
There were a number of factors found to, or predicted to, have an impact on conflict 
frequency and severity, including discrimination and political marginalization of ethnic groups 
and poor economic performance (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Theisen, Holtermann, and Buhaug 
2012). The Transboundary Freshwater Conflict Severity Index, in order to determine the level of 
conflict associated with different water basins, looked at aquifers as an index (Brozek 2013). 
This inclusion of aquifer resources would improve the estimate of water stress drastically. In 
order to try to account for these aforementioned variances, the GDP per country will be included 
in the model, as well the presence of aquifers, and the number of ethnic groups in the area. 
Empirical Research  
Most studies looked merely at the incidence of conflict or the frequency of conflict, 
rather than the severity (Burke et al. 2009; Hendrix and Salehyan 2007; Hendrix and Salehyan 
2012; Irby 2017; O’Laughlin et al. 2012; Raleigh and Urdal 2007; Wolf 1998). Conflict severity 
is thus less well-studied. This study examines the impact water stress has on conflict severity. It 
defines conflict severity, the dependent variable, through the number of total fatalities in each 
conflict. This study only examines conflicts, including conflicts with zero fatalities, and it looks 
exclusively at conflict severity rather than probability of conflict occurrence. All three 
mechanisms described above are plausible, so this study will examine each. The scarcity model 
will be examined through looking purely at temperature and precipitation data, as well as 
whether or not the area has alternative forms of water sources in the form of aquifers. The group 
identity model will be examined through the temperature and precipitation data, as well as 
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whether or not there are multiple ethnic groups in the area. Finally, the economic welfare model 
will be examined through temperature and precipitation data combined with the GDP of the 
countries. This study will also examine whether or not a combination of these different 
mechanisms increases conflict severity. 
This study looks at conflicts in Africa from 1997 to 2014. The dependent variable is the 
number of fatalities in a conflict. A conflict will be defined using the Armed Conflict Location & 
Event Data Project’s definition, defined as the use of force, or a precursor to the use of force, by 
a group with political intentions through the analysis of subsequent events (ACLED 2018).  The 1
independent variables are temperature and precipitation deviation, the number of ethnicities 
within 10 miles of the conflict, the GDP of the country in which the conflict takes place, and 
whether or not the conflict is within 2.5 miles of a transboundary aquifer. Whether or not there 
are any regional effects is examined as well.  
For each conflict, the temperature and precipitation data is taken for that month and 
location from the University of Delaware’s Terrestrial Precipitation and Air Temperature 
databases. The data are then compared to precipitation and temperature data for that month and 
location using the standard deviation and mean of these variables from 1950 to 1996. 
Temperature and precipitation stress are measured by standard deviations from the mean. The 
Geo-Referencing of Ethnic Groups Database was used to determine how many ethnic groups 
1 ACLED studies conflicts through political disorder and violence, and defines it as “the use of force by a group with 
a political purpose or motivation. ACLED defines political violence through its constituent events, the intent of 
which is to produce a comprehensive overview of all forms of political conflict within and across states. A 
politically violent event is a single altercation where force is often used by one or more groups to a political end, 
although some instances – including protests and non- violent activity – are included in the dataset to capture the 
potential pre-cursors or critical junctures in a period of disorder.” (ACLED 2018, 1). There are ten event categories 
included in ACLED, four of which are nonviolent. The first three are different types of battles, then violence against 
civilians, remote violence, riots (violent demonstrations), and protests (non-violent demonstrations). The three other 
main forms of non-violent activity ACLED includes are non-violent takeover of territory, headquarter and base 
establishment, and strategic developments such as looting and high-profile arrests (ACLED 2018). 
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were within 10 miles of the conflict, and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
Database was used to find the annual country GDP for each conflict. Finally, the International 
Groundwater Resources Assessment Council’s Database on Freshwater Resources in Africa was 
used to determine whether or not the conflicts occurred within 2.5 miles of a transboundary 
aquifer in order to estimate the effect of shared water sources on conflict. The dependent 
variable, number of fatalities, was taken from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data 
Project, as well as the regional designation of each country and the location of the conflict.   2
Unlike Wischnath and Buhaug’s 2014 paper, which uses Ordinarily Least Squares, a 
binomial regression is used to determine what, if any, relationship the independent variables 
have with conflict severity. This is a good way of estimating equations when the dependent 
variable is a count that never takes on negative values. Positive water stress and negative water 
stress events will be examined separately to determine if their effects are asymmetric.  
Hypotheses 
Thus, there are several hypotheses taken from the extant literature that are being tested.  
H​0​: As positive water stress increases, so will conflict severity. 
H​1​: As negative water stress increases, so will conflict severity. 
H​2​: As GDP increases, conflict severity will decrease. 
H​3​: As the number of ethnicities in the area increases, so will conflict severity. 
H​4​: The presence of a shared water source will increase conflict severity. 
H​5​: As positive temperature deviations increases, so will conflict severity.  
2 ​ACLED’s regional designations for the different countries are used for this study. Thus, there are other 
regionalizations possible, and this study is sensitive to that. No matter where the regional lines are drawn, certain 
areas will be expected to have outliers, such as any region in which the Democratic Republic of the Congo is 
included due to its abnormally high fatality levels. 
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Results  
Table 1: General Statistics for Fatalities in Positive Water Stress Cases  
Region Mean N Standard Deviation 
Northern Africa 4.8532 6347 23.47627 
Western Africa 2.6917 7471 20.93095 
Middle Africa 17.4769 7024 112.58268 
Eastern Africa 3.6014 12048 16.83702 
Southern Africa 0.1926 3453 0.97520 
Total 5.9909 36343 52.56222 
 
Table 2: General Statistics for Fatalities in Negative Water Stress  
Region Mean N Standard Deviation 
Northern Africa 4.3792 14252 27.14666 
Western Africa 3.2333 10485 16.76975 
Middle Africa 8.9342 8795 65.87061 
Eastern Africa 7.6832 23148 79.20405 
Southern Africa 0.1780 8646 1.02739 
Total 5.4232 65326 54.80431 
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Table 3: Output for Negative Binomial Regression for Negative Water Stress 
Parameter B Standard Error Wald Chi-Square Sig 
(Intercept) 11.063 .1138 9455.584 .000 
[NorthernAfrica=.00] -3.110 .0385 6525.051 .000 
[WesternAfrica=.00] -2.689 .0395 4630.942 .000 
[MiddleAfrica=.00] -4.099 .0390 11054.734 .000 
[EasternAfrica=.00] -3.471 .0377 8485.847 .000 
[SouthernAfrica=.00] 0 - - - 
[Aquifer=0] -.153 .0117 169.902 .000 
GDP -1.121E-12 3.9087E-14 823.101 .000 
Ethnicities .348 .0083 1757.348 .000 
PositiveTemperature .131 .0043 907.742 .000 
NegativeWater .115 .0068 289.761 .000 
Table 4: Output for Negative Binomial Regression for Positive Water Stress 
Parameter B Standard Error Wald Chi-Square Sig 
(Intercept) 14.631 1.8417 63.112 .000 
[NorthernAfrica=.00] -4.481 .6521 47.229 .000 
[WesternAfrica=.00] -2.650 .6537 16.433 .000 
[MiddleAfrica=.00] -4.531 .6690 45.875 .000 
[EasternAfrica=.00] -2.734 .6114 19.997 .000 
[SouthernAfrica=.00] 0 - - - 
[Aquifer=0] -.296 .3258 .825 .364 
GDP -1.235E-12 1.0270E-12 1.446 .229 
Ethnicities .247 .1749 2.001 .157 
PositiveTemperature -.022 .0345 .400 .527 
PositiveWater .008 .0081 .941 .332 
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Table 5: Output for Negative Binomial Regression for Positive Water Stress​ ​in Middle  
Africa  
Parameter B Standard Error Wald Chi-Square Sig 
(Intercept) 1.567 .0450 1211.849 .000 
[Aquifer=0] .284 .0315 81.053 .000 
GDP 9.108E-15 1.5559E-13 .003 .953 
Ethnicities -.133 .0152 75.964 .000 
PositiveTemperature .031 .056 18.681 .000 
PositiveWater .056 .0031 100.639 .000 
 
Table 6: Output for Negative Binomial Regression for Positive Water Stress in Eastern,  
Northern, Western, and Southern Africa Water Stress 
Parameter B Standard Error Wald Chi-Square Sig 
(Intercept) 1.210 .0234 2675.616 .000 
[Aquifer=0] -.447 .0176 642.770 .000 
GDP -2.699E-13 5.0959E-14 28.061 .000 
Ethnicities .199 .0113 310.643 .000 
PositiveTemperature -.012 .0025 22.333 .000 
PositiveWater -.002 .0008 10.372 .001 
 
How negative water stress affects conflict was examined first. The negative binomial 
regression found a statistically significant relationship between conflict severity and increased 
temperature stress, as well as increased ethnicity density and the presence of a shared aquifer. All 
three of these variables were positively correlated with conflict intensity. The regression further 
revealed a positive correlation between negative water stress and conflict severity, and a negative 
correlation between GDP and conflict severity. 
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Looking at how positive water stress impacted conflict severity, strong differing regional 
trends were found. As a result, the regional variables were explaining nearly all the variance in 
the severity data. With all regions being included, the binomial regression did not find any 
statistically significant relationship between any of the intended independent variables and 
conflict severity. Looking back at the general statistics found for the positive water stress 
conflicts, Middle Africa had a much higher average fatality count, with a much larger standard 
deviation than the other regions. This region had significantly different conflict severity levels 
when dealing with positive water stress than the rest. 
In order to test to see if the insignificant relationships in positive water stress conflicts 
were because the regional variables were masking a relationship between fatalities and the other 
right hand side variables, the dataset was split into two, one looking at the conflicts in Middle 
Africa, and the other looking at conflicts in Eastern, Northern, Western, and Southern Africa. 
Looking at the conflicts separately, statistically significant, though differing, results were found. 
Looking first at the Middle Africa region, GDP was not found to have statistically significant 
results. The presence of a transboundary aquifer had a negative relation to conflict severity, as 
did the number of ethnic groups. Positive temperature stress and positive water stress were both 
found to have statistically significant positive effects on conflict severity.  
Moving onto the rest of Africa, the results were different. The presence of a 
transboundary aquifer was found to have a statistically significant positive relationship with 
conflict severity. The negative binomial regression found that GDP had a significant negative 
relationship with conflict severity, as did positive temperature and water stress. It also found that 
ethnicity density had a positive relationship with conflict severity.  
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In summary, H​0​, that as positive water stress increases, so will conflict severity, had 
conflicting support from the data once the regional differences in positive water stress events 
were accounted for. There was a statistically significant positive relationship found in Middle 
Africa, with a statistically significant negative relationship found in the rest of Africa. H​1​, that as 
negative water stress increases, so will conflict severity, was supported by the data with the 
negative binomial regression results. H​2​, that as GDP of the country increases, conflict severity 
will decrease, had conflicting results. When looking at negative water stress conflicts, there was 
a negative correlation found with the negative binomial regression, which supports the 
hypothesis. In the positive water stress regressions, the relation between GDP and conflict 
severity was insignificant in Middle Africa, but was significant and negative in Southern, 
Eastern, Northern, and Western Africa. This could possibly be because other pre-existing issues 
supercede the effect of GDP in Middle Africa, or it could be because there is not as large of a 
disparity in GDP variance in Middle Africa as in the rest of Africa.  
H​3​, that increasing numbers of ethnicities in the area will result in increasing conflict 
severity, also had conflicting support from the data. Again, when looking at negative water 
stress, a significant positive relation was found. When looking at positive water stress regionally 
divided, however, only the negative binomial regression for Southern, Eastern, Northern, and 
Western Africa showed a statistically significant positive relationship while the Middle Africa 
region showed a statistically significant negative relationship. Again, this could be because other 
regional issues in Middle Africa supercede ethnic divides. H​4​, that the presence of a shared 
groundwater source will lead to increased conflict severity, also had conflicting support from the 
data. A positive correlation was found during both negative water stress and positive water stress 
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in Southern, Eastern, Northern, and Western Africa, though a statistically significant negative 
relationship was found in Middle Africa for the presence of an aquifer. Finally, H​5​, that as 
positive temperature deviations increase, so will conflict severity, had conflicting support. There 
was a statistically significant positive relationship in negative water stress conflicts and in 
positive water stress conflicts in Middle Africa, but a statistically significant negative 
relationship in Southern, Eastern, Northern, and Western Africa. Essentially, all the hypotheses 
were supported when dealing with negative water stress conflicts, and in positive water stress 
conflicts the hypotheses had conflicting support. 
These results mostly fit with previous studies. The relationship between temperature 
stress and conflict stress had been found in a few studies (Buhaug 2010; Irby 2017; O’Laughlin 
et al. 2012). The relation between ethnic divides and conflict severity has also been established 
in a number of studies (Casselli and Coleman II 2006; Irby 2017). In fact, one of the studies that 
found little evidence of a connection between drought and conflict found a connection between 
ethnic divides and conflict (Irby 2017). Theisen, Holtermann, and Buhaug (2012) found that 
while drought conditions do not make conflict more likely to occur, political marginalization 
along ethnic lines does. The connection between water stress and conflict has less established 
support. A number of studies found results supporting at least one of the kinds of water stress 
contributing to conflict frequency or severity (Burke et al. 2009; Hendrix and Salehyan 2012; 
Hsiang 2013), though some studies found that there was no relationship. Hendrix and Salehyan 
(2012), unlike this study, actually found definitive results that positive water stress is related to 
conflict. These studies tended to differ from this one because of differing definitions of what 
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entails a conflict, inadequate environmental data, or because they were looking at conflict 
frequency, rather than conflict severity.  
Many studies that do not support this finding have differing interpretations of what 
defines a conflict (Burke et al. 2009; O’Laughlin et al. 2012; Wischnath and Buhaug 2014). 
Theisen, Holtermann, and Buhaug (2012), for example, focused exclusively on large-scale 
conflict, requiring a certain minimum fatality rate in order to be classified as a conflict, thereby 
leaving out small-scale conflicts. Many of the conflicts over water resources, or even related to 
water stress, are not going to be interstate wars, and may not have fatalities (Homer-Dixon 
1994). Many of the studies also (Brozek 2013; Gleick 1993; Wolf 1998; Yoffe et al. 2004) 
looked only at conflicts specifically classified as water conflicts, despite the fact that for water 
stress to contribute to a conflict does not require for it to be the only, or even just the primary, 
factor, or even for it to be identified by observers or participants as playing a role. It simply 
means that water stress affected the outcomes, regardless of who was aware of it. Other studies 
only looked a different and narrower region; O’Laughlin et al. (2012), for example, looked 
exclusively at Eastern Africa conflicts. 
Some studies also had relatively coarse environmental data, using annual precipitation 
and temperature data, sometimes at the country-level, to apply to each conflict (Burke et al. 
2009; Hendrix and Salehyan 2012). A few studies would only examine precipitation patterns to 
determine whether or not there was water stress, ignoring the existence of alternative water 
sources, such as aquifers (Burke et al. 2009; Irby 2017; Raleigh and Urdal 2007), while another 
study only looked at aquifer and surface water sources, and did not examine precipitation 
patterns (Wolf 1998). A number of the studies looked at the probability of conflict occurring, 
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rather than severity (Burke et al. 2009; Hendrix and Salehyan 2007; O’Laughlin et al. 2012; 
Raleigh and Urdal 2007; Wolf 1998). Other studies measured conflict frequency rather than 
fatalities to measure severity (Hendrix and Salehyan 2012; Irby 2017). The strictly qualitative 
studies (Gleick 1993; Homer-Dixon 1994) lacked the systematic examination of large numbers 
of cases. 
Discussion 
There is much research left to be explored in this field. While this study looked at 
regional trends, there are significant environmental differences between different climate zones. 
This study attempted to counteract this bias through the use of standard deviations to evaluate 
precipitation and temperature changes, but different climate zones, such as arid regions to 
tropical regions, will have other environmental differences as well. Further research on this topic 
should look into how climate zones affect the impact of altered precipitation patterns on climate 
severity as well as whether or not the type of aquifer has any effect. Knowing how easily 
accessible the aquifer is, as well as whether or not it is rain-fed, would impact its usefulness in 
water stressed periods. Furthermore, expanding this research beyond Africa should be explored, 
as well as seeing what effect, if any, the type and strength of government has any conflict 
severity in a country. Politically speaking, tribal governments are less able to develop a 
comprehensive, enforceable policy than central governments, for example (Battig and Bernauer 
2009; Sikainga 2009).  
This study used Gross Domestic Product as an estimate of economic well-being, but 
further studies should also explore how agricultural outputs affect the vulnerability to water 
stress, especially in areas which are dependent on rainfed agriculture, as well as determining the 
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economic status on a regional level in addition to the country level. More than half of the African 
continent’s entire population depends on agriculture as a form of livelihood (United Nations 
2013). Whether a country exports primarily natural resources will impact their vulnerability to 
climate change, and thus, their likelihood of experiencing climate conflicts. Countries whose 
trade depends on primary resources are in general also more prone to conflict, perhaps due to 
their inherent vulnerability to supply shortages (Humphreys 2003). The irrigation patterns could 
also explain the difference between regions. Most countries depend directly on rainfall; as 
temperatures increase and water distribution changes, agricultural water needs will change (Pauli 
1996). Sub-Saharan Africa’s agricultural sector is also 70% small farms, and in Africa as a 
whole 94% of cropland is rainfed (Gleick 1993; Taylor, Koussis, and Tindimugaya 2009, 660). 
Only nine African countries irrigate more than 10% of their cropland, and nearly 20 nations have 
effectively no irrigation supplies at all (Gleick 1993, 91).  
Furthermore, more fine-grained regional analysis should be explored to determine why 
the positive water stress regressions had such differing results in Middle Africa as opposed to 
Eastern, Southern, Northern, and Western Africa, as well as analyses of the population patterns. 
Whether or not there is a significant difference in GDP distribution and ethnic group distribution 
between these two areas should be explored, as well as how the usage of groundwater differs and 
alternative water sources. Analyzing the data through the types of conflicts could also explain the 
differences in positive water stress conflicts, especially if there were conflicts with significantly 
greater fatalities in Middle Africa. The population patterns of the different areas could also have 
an influence. Rapid population growth, increased urbanization, especially in high-risk areas, and 
dependence on industries sensitive to climate such as rainfed agriculture are all risk factors to 
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being vulnerable to water stress -- many African nations are experiencing all three (Brown, 
Hammill, Mcleman 2007, 1149; Taylor, Koussis, and Tindimugaya 2009; Theisen, Holtermann, 
and Buhaug 2012). Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, has one of the highest urbanization rates in 
world. By 2050, the region’s urban populations are projected to triple that of 2000. These 
differences could account for the positive water stress conflict differences. 
Conclusion 
This study shows that increased water stress leads to more severe conflicts, especially in 
areas that are already going to experience more extreme consequences of climate change, and 
showed support for the hypothesized mechanisms, especially for negative water stress conflicts. 
First, when precipitation is abnormally low, there is more competition for water, and areas that 
have water sources that are shared are going to have more severe conflicts. Because there is that 
limitation on supply, it becomes more of an “all-or-nothing” dynamic. This is especially true in 
places with pre-existing divides, such as areas with many ethnic groups. Areas with low GDPs 
are also less able to cope with that decrease in precipitation, and are more likely to rely on rain 
for their survival, and areas that are predisposed to conflict are also more likely to experience 
severe conflicts. Africa in particular is vulnerable on all of these fronts. As a result of climate 
change, Africa will have higher temperatures and more extreme precipitation patterns (Brown, 
Hammill, and Mcleman 2007; Hendrix and Salehyan 2012; Taylor, Koussis, and Tindimugaya 
2009). The continent already has large numbers of intrastate and interstate ethnic groups (Brozek 
2013; Hitchcock 1993). Only about 5% of arable land in Africa is irrigated, leaving it dependent 
on reliable and steady rainfall (Taylor, Koussis, and Tindimugaya 2009). Furthermore, Africa 
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has an extremely interdependent hydrological structure, and there are more water sources shared 
there than on any other continent (Brozek 2013).  
These concerns and risks are not just limited to Africa. In the Middle East, strong ethnic 
divides characterize many countries in the region, with frequent rounds of infighting and 
influence from outside forces (Sarto 2017). Perhaps more so than in any other conflict, the 
Israel-Palestine relationship specifically demonstrates how water stress can be used as a weapon 
in conflict. Israel controls Palestinian access to water directly; the country blocks Palestinians 
from accessing the Jordan River through military power, forcing many Palestinians to buy water 
from the Israelis at inflated prices. Mekorot, the Israeli water company, supplies an estimated 
50% of the water consumed in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Residents in Israel and the 
settlements drink about three times as much water as Palestinians living in the West Bank do 
(Lazarou 2016). Throughout the year, water to the West Bank will occasionally be shut down, 
forcing the Palestinians to pay for water at a 500% markup from tap water (Asser 2010; Corradin 
2016). This causes the Palestinians to leave or relocate due to a lack of basic supplies, such as 
sanitation and potable water. In turn, this makes it easier for Israelis to expand their settlements 
and develop more power in the area, and further justify an inordinate distribution of water 
(Corradin 2016).  
Even in the United States, since 2000, a drought plagued the Southwest United States and 
Mexico, sending water levels plummeting in the Colorado River, among other bodies of water. 
Lake Mead, a reservoir in the Colorado river, reached its lowest point since the 1930s (Kennedy 
2014). This reservoir and the river supply water for a 40,000 person population spread across 
seven states in the U.S. and two Mexican states. It also supplies agriculture in the United States 
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that grows 15% of the nation’s food (Snider 2016). While the United States may have the upper 
hand in control of the Colorado River, Mexico has control over the Rio Grande, which flows into 
Texas (Carter, Mulligan, and Seelke 2017). As a result, Mexico is able to have a card to play in 
negotiations where it otherwise would be at the mercy of the will of the United States and the 
international community’s interference. In September of 2017, however, a new treaty was 
announced, called Minute 323, as an addendum to the 1944 treaty, which not only redistributed 
the river’s water, but also actually allotted some to the environment for restoration.  
In order to help prevent more severe conflicts as water stress grows, there are a few 
mitigation strategies that could be used, including water-sharing treaties such as that between 
Mexico and the United States. International governmental institutions have an effect on climate 
change and climate conflict (Wolf 1998). Mediation, arbitration, and alternative 
dispute-resolution mechanisms are all made possible, and more probable, with the presence of a 
trusted third-party organization. Having an international arbitrating body allows for the 
delegation of authority to that intergovernmental organization, thereby resolving the need for a 
power disparity. This allows the nations to have a third party monitor treaty enforcement, 
conduct conflict resolution, and ensure that joint monitoring is being conducted fairly and 
equitably. Agreements and treaties with these characteristics have been found to better manage 
water stress-induced conflicts, and there is evidence to show that mediation and cooperation can 
arise from water-stressed situations as well (Tir 2012).  
Furthermore, international organizations may assist developing countries with creating 
development and adaptive capacities where individual countries are lacking. These organizations 
can also help developing countries skip over the carbon-intensive industrial practices once used 
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by the developed world through technological and knowledge transfer (Salehyan 2008). In 
addition to international efforts, there also needs to be work done on the national and local scale. 
In the United States in particular, despite being a strong central democracy, voter opposition, 
misinformation, and a strong fossil fuel industry have severely curtailed the country’s ability to 
develop long-lasting and effective climate change policy. Therefore, high voter participation is 
required to increase the chances of a democracy having effective climate change policy; voter 
participation can help lead to higher levels of public participation and government 
accountability, lower levels of corruption, and a farsighted government (Uddin 2017).  
The increasing global temperature affects everyone, but not to the same degree and not 
everyone is equally vulnerable. Those that are the most vulnerable are also the ones most at the 
mercy of others. While these smaller, less-developed countries are the most vulnerable to both 
climate change and subsequently more severe climate change, the tragic irony is they are also the 
least able to personally impact the rising global temperatures (IPCC 2001). A country the size of 
the Philippines going completely green would still not save as much carbon emissions as a 
country like the United States decreasing their emissions by 95% (Global Carbon Atlas 2016). It 
is important to note that increased average per capita income in a country does not necessarily 
correlate to higher levels of environmental sustainability. In Robert Looney’s 2016 study, he 
found “countries [that prioritized environmental sustainability]... had somewhat lower average 
per capita income ($25,015 vs. $37,095).” While more-developed countries freely used products 
that released greenhouse gases, less-developed countries are not able to without worsening their 
own situation. Areas that are particularly vulnerable to water stress include the Middle East and 
Southeast Asia, as well as many parts of Africa, meaning that other countries’ interests in those 
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areas are also vulnerable. Thus, a global effort must be undertaken to help limit the effects of 
climate change and also to help those that are most at risk prepare for what is to come.  
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Appendix 
Table 9: Regional Assignments of African Countries by ACLED 
 
Eastern Africa Western Africa Middle Africa Northern Africa Southern Africa 
Burundi Benin Angola Algeria Botswana 
Djibouti Burkina Faso Cameroon Egypt Lesotho 
Eritrea Gambia Central African 
Republic 
Libya Namibia 
Ethiopia Ghana Chad Morocco South Africa 
Kenya Guinea Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
Sudan Swaziland 
Madagascar Guinea-Bissau Equatorial Guinea Tunisia Zambia 
Malawi Ivory Coast Gabon  Zimbabwe 
Mozambique Liberia Republic of 
Congo 
  
Rwanda Mali    
Somalia Mauritania    
South Sudan Niger    
Tanzania Nigeria    
Uganda Senegal    
 Sierra Leone    
 Togo    
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